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Abstract 
This paper, using nationally representative household surveys, examines the changes in the 
membership structure of the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the 1990s. We 
concentrate on urban China and investigate how socioeconomic characteristics of the region 
(city) influence the membership structure of the regional party organization, focusing on the 
CPC members' age structure, structure of educational level, and occupational structure. The 
major findings and their implications are as follows. First, it is suggested that the 
marketization makes it more difficult for the party to recruit well-educated and professionally 
qualified youths. This finding will reflect the fact the marketization has enlarged 
opportunities for younger generation to gain socioeconomic success without the CPC 
membership. Second, the finding also implies that the younger generation's incentives for 
joining the CPC has been increasingly important determinants of the CPC membership 
structure. Third, as the result, the technocratic reorganization of urban party organization 
seems to progress through the conventional bureaucratic-elite path in governmental and 
public-owned sector rather than through the newly emerging qualified professional elite path, 
suggesting dual elite paths in urban society. 
JEL classification: P36 
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 11. Introduction 
Setting the agenda 
This paper examines the changes in the membership structure of the Communist Party of 
China (hereafter referred to as the party) during the 1990s. We concentrate on urban China 
and investigate how socioeconomic characteristics of the region (city) influence the 
membership structure of the regional party organization, focusing on the party members' age 
structure, structure of educational level, and occupational structure.
2  In doing so, we will be 
able to understand that it is not easy an easy task for the party to restructure its membership 
structure to cope with marketization. We will also be able to understand people's changing 
incentives in pursuing socioeconomic success in a market economy under the one party rule.   
  The main data source for this paper are nationally representative repeated 
cross-section surveys on household income conducted in 1988, 1995, and 2002 by the 
Chinese Household Income Project Team at the Institute of Economics, the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) (hereafter referred to as the 1988, 1995, and 2002 
CASS CHIP surveys). Sample households of the CASS CHIP surveys are subsamples of the 
official annual household surveys conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). By 
utilizing the sampling frame of the NBS, the CASS CHIP surveys ensure representativeness 
for both urban and rural areas.
3 
  We organize the present paper as follows. In the following part of section 1, we 
firstly summarize the party's membership principle and recruiting policy in the post-reform 
era. Then we review previous literature. In section 2, we overview changes in the 
membership structure of the party between 1988 and 2002, focusing on gender, age, 
educational, and occupational status. In section 3, we conduct city-based estimations of the 
determinants of the party's membership structure, using OLS. Section 4 concludes. 
  As the ruling party of the world's largest transition economy, the party has been 
modifying its primary mission from pursuing the socialist "modernization (xiandaihua)" in 
the early 1980s to building the socialist "market economy (shichang jingji)" in the 
mid-1990s. Regarding to the recruiting policy to pursue the primary mission, the party has 
 2been emphasizing the "four transformations (sihua)" of the membership structure: 
"revolutionized (geminhua)"; "younger (nianqinghua)"; "intellectual and well-educated 
(zhishihua)"; and "highly professionalized (zhuanyehua)".
4 Since the "revolutionization" of 
party members just symbolizes the party's principle and the political screening has been the 
most basic procedure for recruiting new members, the main emphasis after the 1980s 
actually has been falling on the latter three qualifications. With regard to the membership 
principle, it was not until 2001-2002 that the party has explicitly modified the membership 
principle in order to widen its organizational basis. On July 1, 2002, General Secretary Jiang 
Zemin declared that the newly emerging social strata such as business founders (chuangye 
renyuan) and technical staffs (jishu renyuan) of non-public hi-tech enterprises, managerial 
and technical staffs of foreign-invested enterprises, the self-employed (getihu), private 
entrepreneurs are also contributors toward the Chinese socialism (People's Daily, July 2, 
2002). According to this new view of social stratification, the constitution of the party was 
amended at the 16th national congress of the party held in November 2002. The new party 
constitution prescribes that, in addition to worker, peasant, member of the armed forces, and 
intellectual, "any advanced element of other social strata" can apply for party membership 
(Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], November 15, 2002).
5 The term "advanced (xianjin)" is 
based on Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents (sange daibiao)" doctrine, which advocates that 
the party should represent "advanced productive forces," "advanced culture," and the 
"fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of Chinese people." Entrepreneurs and 
business elites in non-public owned sector become eligible for party membership because 
they represent "advanced productive forces" (Jiang 2001). The 16th party congress also 
advocates that the "governing ability (zhizheng nengli)" of the party be improved. From the 
standpoint of recruiting policy, the improvement of governing ability can be understood that 
greater emphasis is put on educational and professional competencies (Zhonggong 
Zhongyang 2004). 
Previous literature 
Dickson and Rublee (2000), using the below-mentioned 1988 CASS CHIP survey, 
investigated the relative importance of party membership and educational attainment for 
socioeconomic success in urban China. They present separate paths in regards to career 
 3mobility: first, on the one hand, for the most socially prestigious jobs, not a party 
membership but a college degree has become increasingly important; second, on the other 
hand, intellectuals now have privileged access to the party. This account leads us to an 
assumption that the importance of education relative to political reliability for party 
membership will increase. Bian, Shu, and Logan (2001), using sample surveys conducted in 
Tianjin and Shanghai in 1993, examined how the criteria for political screening and 
educational credentials evolved in the attainment of party membership during the period 
between 1949 and 1993. As is summarized below, their empirical analysis on the changes in 
party membership attainment showed an increasing importance of educational credentials.   
Political and sociological studies on Chinese bureaucracy have also illustrated the shift from 
political loyalty from technocratic ability in the major qualification for bureaucrats. Shirk 
(1984) discussed that the failures of “virtuocracy” as a management regime in the 
late-Maoist era. Lee (1991) claimed the decline of revolutionary cadres and the rise of party 
technocrats. Parish and Tang (2000), using the 1988 CASS CHIP survey, also concluded that 
the major qualification for bureaucrats has changed from virtuocracy to meritcracy after the 
economic reform and that the educational level of party members has been increasing. 
In this paper, we try to elaborate the previous literature in the following way: first, 
we utilize recent and more comprehensive data and observe changes in the membership 
structure during the 1990s; second, in addition to examine the individual characteristics 
those who have already become the party members, we will investigate the changes in the 
incentives of people who are possible candidates for the party members by conducting 
city-based estimations of the determinants of membership structure in 1995 and 2002.
6 
2. Membership structure of the party, 1988-2002 
Gender,age, and education 
The total number of the party members has been growing rapidly during the 1990s, from 51 
million in 1992 to 68 million in 2003. By comparing the 2002 and 1988 CASS CHIP surveys, 
we firstly overview changes in gender, age, and educational attainments of party members 
during the 1990s. The following points can be made. 
 4First, gender balance has improved between 1988 and 2002, although the party was still 
dominated by male members in 2002. Our data report that the proportion of female party 
members has increased from 24.9 percent in 1988 to 36.0 percent in 2002. 
    Table 1. Age and education of urban party members, 1988 and 2002 
Second, table 1. A reports that the party members' age structure has become older between 
1988 and 2002 and that, comparing with the entire population, the party members' age 
structure is older in both reference years. For example, in 2002, approximately 11 percent of 
urban party members were between the ages of 18 and 34, whereas in the entire urban 
population, the proportion of the same age cohort was about 38 percent.
7 
Third, from table 1. B, it is shown that party members' educational level has risen between 
1988 and 2002 and that difference in educational level by party membership have also widen 
between the two reference years. The increase in party members having college graduate or 
above educational attainment is especially remarkable. Percentage-point difference in the 
proportion of college graduates by party membership has widened from 16 percentage-points 
in 1988 to 23 percentage-points in 2002. 
    Table 2 Distribution of age at joining the party 
Fourth, table 2 shows that age at joining the party has been getting older over time, 
especially after the 1980s. During the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-78), 61 
percent of urban members entered the party at ages 18-24. In 1979-88, however, the 
proportion of members who joined the party at ages 18-24 decreased to 23 percent. This 
trend accelerated sharply in the 1990s. We assume that this tendency suggests a trade-off 
between recruiting younger generation and absorbing well-educated and qualified 
professionals into the party and that incentives of younger generation to joining the party 
have been declining. 
    Table 3 Probit estimation of the determinants of party membership 
  To elaborate the changes in the correlation of individual attributes with the party 
membership, we have conducted probit estimation of the determinants of party membership 
 5for selected historical periods. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the party 
membership (1 = party member) of cohorts ages 18-34 in each historical period. Explanatory 
variables are as follows: gender (dummy for male gender); dummies for educational 
credentials (college or above, senior high school, junior high school or below); dummy for 
father's party membership (1 = party member). The selected historical periods are 1966-73 
(the Cultural Revolution/9th-10th party congresses), 1987-92 (early reform era, 13th-14th 
party congresses), and 1997-2002 (15th-16th party congresses). 
  The estimation results are summarized in table 3, and the following points can be 
made from the table. First, the positive effect of male gender on membership attainment has 
been decreasing. Gender has finally become statistically insignificant in the years 1997-2002. 
Second, the positive effect of educational credentials on membership attainment has 
increased. Both college and senior high school level educational credentials became positive 
and significant in the period 1966-73, and the effects have been increasing. Third, although a 
father's party membership has been less than the significant level of 10 percent in all the 
selected periods, it is noteworthy that both the coefficient and the significance level have 
become larger in the current period.   
Occupational status 
Here we compare the occupational structure of party members and non-party members by 
table 4. The share of working population with higher occupational status --cadres, executives, 
professionals/engineers, or private entrepreneurs-- among party members is much higher 
than in non-party members, as was expected. It is notable that the difference in the 
proportion of professionals/engineers (zhuanye jishu renyuan) by party membership has 
narrowed between 1988 and 2002 (from 9 percentage-points to 4 percentage-points). From 
table 4.B, which extract the composition of urban working population with higher 
occupational status, it is shown that party members of higher occupational status tend to be 
in governmental and other public institutions. By contrast, non-party members with higher 
occupational status are more likely to be professionals/engineers of enterprises, especially 
non-public enterprises. Summing up, professionalization of the occupational structure of 
urban party members has been progressing through the conventional bureaucratic-elite rather 
than through the qualified professional elite, suggesting dual elite paths under the 
 6development of marketization. This is consistent with the discussions by previous literature 
on social mobility in post-communist countries (Dickson and Rublee 2000, Hanley and 
Treiman 2003, Walder, Li, and Treiman 2000).   
  Table 4 Occupational structure of urban party members, 1988-2002 
 
3. Determinants of membership structure, 2002 
Working hypothesis 
In this section, we conduct a city-based estimation of the determinants of membership 
structure in 2002 and 1995, using the 2002 and 1995 CASS CHIP surveys. We hypothesize 
that the membership structure of the party is determined by the interaction of the party's 
recruiting activities to absorb eligible members and people's incentives to joining the party.   
  In regard to the party’s recruiting policy, Bian, Shu, and Logan (2001) argued that 
the party has shifted its emphasis from ideological loyalty to educational credentials in order 
to recruit more technocratic elites. Their data on Tianjin and Shanghai supported their 
argument. Using event history analysis, they found the following facts: First, educational 
credentials has emerged to be a significant determinant of party membership in the 
post-1978 period; second, although political screening has been persistently important in all 
post-1949 periods, the screening principle has shifted from class status ("redness" in born) 
and revolutionary ideology to loyalty to the party's mission. Their findings are consistent 
with the above-mentioned membership principle and recruiting policy after the 1980s. Our 
findings on the party' membership structure confirm a rising educational attainment of party 
members compared with non-party members. However, it should be noted that our data also 
show that the difference in the proportion of professionals/engineers  to total number of 
working population by party membership has narrowed between 1988 and 2002, suggesting 
an emerging path to qualified professional elites without party membership. 
  Regarding to people's incentives to joining the party, we assume that, along with the 
marketization, this factor have become increasingly important in determining the party's 
 7membership structure. This assumption does not necessary mean the decreasing incentives to 
get party membership. We hypothesize that several opposite factors affect their incentives. 
First, ideological appeal of communism has declined greatly in recent years and it will give a 
negative incentive to becoming a party member. Second, as is suggested in table 4, 
marketization has enlarged people's opportunities for gaining socioeconomic success without 
the party membership. This will reduce people's incentive for joining the party and will make 
the party's recruiting policy to absorb well-educated youth more difficult to carry out. Third, 
there still exist a party member's income premium in labor market, especially in public 
owned sector (see for example Dickson and Rublee 2000, Sato 2006). Although there is a 
debate whether the party member's premium is the premium for political status or just for 
unobserved abilities that made them party members (see Li et al. 2006 for the debate), 
persisting positive correlation between party membership and income suggests persisting 
positive incentives for joining the party.   
It will be safe to assume that regional variations in the party's membership 
principles and recruiting policy are very small. Therefore, we hypothesize that, if there are 
regional differences in the membership structure of the local party organization, they are 
mainly influenced by the differences in people's incentive structure among regions. We 
assume that people's incentive structure is affected by the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the region. Based on these hypotheses, we proceed to the city-based estimation of the 
determinants of the membership structure. 
Analytical framework 
  Table 5 Analytical framework of the determinants of membership structure 
Our estimation framework is shown in table 5. The dependent variables are the party's 
membership structure. Specifically, we set the following three variables that indicate the 
outcomes of the party's recruiting policy (the "four transformations") as the dependent 
variables and conduct city-based OLS estimations by employing explanatory variables on 
the regional socioeconomic structure. To investigate changes in the determinants of 
membership structure, we compare estimation results of 2002 and 1995, using the 2002 and 
1995 CASS CHIP surveys. We have two reasons not to utilize data for 1988. One reason is 
 8that the variations in regional economic structure (specifically ownership structure and 
occupational structure) seem to be not diversified enough in 1988. The other reason is that 
we anticipate some changes in people's incentive structure between 1995 and 2002 because 
the privatization of small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and labor 
retrenchment (xiagang) has accelerated after the mid-1990s. 
a. Juvenescence of the age structure 
As a measurement of the participation rate of younger generation, we employ 
logit-transformed proportion of party members at ages 18-34 to the total number of party 
members in the city. 
b. Improvement of educational level   
To measure the improvement of educational level of party members, we introduce the 
logit-transformed proportion of well-educated party members to the total number of party 
members of the city. We define well-educated as an educational level of college or above. 
c. The degree of professionalization (Share of qualified professionals/engineers) 
Regarding to the professionalization of the party, we focus on to what degree the urban party 
organizations have absorbed qualified professionals. We define qualified professionals by 
those who hold the titles of higher (gaoji) or intermediate (zhongji) levels of 
professionals/engineers.  
 
The explanatory variables are socioeconomic characteristics of the city level. 
1. Overall level of regional economic development: We employ average income (per capita 
annual net income of sample households, including in-kind income) at the city level as the 
measurement of overall level of regional economic development. We hypothesize that 
peoples incentives to joining the party are negatively correlated with the income level of the 
region because, in general, the higher the income level of the region, the wider the 
socioeconomic opportunities for local people. Moreover, we anticipate that this correlation 
 9will become stronger over time. Therefore we expect increasing negative correlations 
between the level of regional income and each of the dependent variable. 
2. Level of economic diversification: As a proxy of the level of marketization of the region, 
we employ the share of non-public owned sector employment to total working population. 
The non-public owned sector employment is defined as employment in all the non-public 
owned workplaces (workplaces other than governmental and other public institutions, SOEs, 
and collectively owned enterprises). We assume that the incentive of well-educated youths 
for joining the party will be affected by their evaluation of the ownership structure of the 
regional economy. When decline of public owned sector in a city is regarded as an 
unstabilization of local economic environment by well-educated youths, they will incline to 
stabilize their career paths by joining the party. If well-educated youths see new 
opportunities for socioeconomic success in the development of non-public owned sector, 
their incentives to joining the party will decrease. As is suggested above, we hypothesize that 
people’s evaluation of ownership sector has been changing during the 1990s, especially after 
the mid-1990s, and that well-educated youths have increasingly begun to see new 
opportunities in non-public owned sector where the party membership is not an 
indispensable factor for success. Thus we anticipate decreasing positive effects or increasing 
negative effects of the level of economic diversification on the improvement of the party's 
age, educational, and occupational structures.     
3.  Historical basis of the party: We hypothesize that whether or not the local party 
organization has a strong historical basis affects the current membership structure. As a 
proxy of the historical basis of the party, we introduce the proportion of party members 
whose fathers also have party membership to the total number of party members, that is, the 
degree of intergenerational transmission of party membership. We hypothesize that the 
restructuring of the membership structure is easier where the party has stronger historical 
basis. Thus we anticipate positive correlations of this factor with the measurement of the 
membership structure. Due to the data availability, this variable is employed only for 2002. 
Empirical results 
The results of city-based OLS estimations of the membership structure are reported in table 6. 
 10As is summarized below by each explanatory variable, the estimation results basically 
support our working hypothesis.   
Overall level of regional economic development: In the case of the juvenescence of 
age structure, the standardized coefficients for the level of regional income are negative and 
statistically significant both in 1995 and 2002. Regarding to the improvement of educational 
level, the same coefficients show decreasing positive effects, statistically significant in 1995 
and has become insignificant in 2002. Concerning to the degree of professionalization, the 
effects of regional income has changed from positive to negative between 1995 and 2002, 
although both are not statistically significant. Although the results are not so clear-cut, it is 
suggested that the party has begun to face difficulty in recruiting well-educated youths in 
higher income cities in 2002. 
Level of economic diversification: In regard to the improvement of educational 
level, the standardized coefficients for non-public owned sector employment show 
increasing negative effects between 1995 and 2002. Similarly, the effects of non-public 
owned sector employment on the juvenescence of age structure has changed from positive to 
negative between 1995 and 2002, although both are statistically insignificant. Moreover, 
there are negative correlations between the degree of professionalization and the share of 
non-public owned sector both in both reference years and it becomes significant in 2002.
8 
These findings suggest that well-educated youths have increasingly found chances for 
success in the diversification of ownership structure and thus their incentives for joining the 
party has been decreasing in the well-developed and economically diversified cities. 
Historical basis of the party: It is notable that the transmission of the party 
membership has significant positive effects on all the three measurements of membership 
structure. In fact, it is the only statistically significant variable that positively correlates with 
the degree of professionalization. This finding ironically implies that the party's recruiting 
policy depend considerably on the historical basis of the local party organization. 
Table 6 Determinants of membership structure 
 
 115. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have investigated the regional differences in the determinants of 
the party's membership structure in 1995 and 2002, by conducting the city-based OLS 
estimations. The major findings and their implications can be summarized as follows.   
First, our empirical result suggests that, although the party is eager to restructure its 
organizational base to cope better with the "socialist market economy," the development of 
marketization makes it more difficult for the party to recruit well-educated and 
professionally qualified youths. This finding will reflect the changes in the opportunity 
structure for urban younger generation. The development of non-public owned sector and the 
restructuring of the public owned sector (labor retrenchment policy and privatization of 
medium- and small-sized SOEs) in the 1990shave, on the one hand, enlarged opportunities 
for younger generation to gain socioeconomic success without the party membership and, on 
the other hand, have decreased people's confidence in public owned sector.   
Second, this finding supports our assumption that, in addition to the party's 
recruiting policy, people's own incentives for joining the party have been increasingly 
important determinants of the party's membership structure. The decline of the traditional 
communist ideology will also foster this tendency. It seems to be e ironic that, though the 
party does not emphasized "men of good stock (chushen xuetong)" in its recruiting policy 
now, , in fact, the historical basis of the party plays an important role in staving off the 
weakening of party organization in urban China. 
Third, as the result, the technocratic reorganization of urban party organization 
seems to progress through the conventional bureaucratic-elite path in governmental and 
public-owned sector rather than through the newly emerging qualified professional elite path, 
suggesting dual elite paths in urban society. The party's new membership principle after 2002 
that advocates to absorb the newly emerging "advanced elements" such as 
professional/engineers of non-public hi-tech enterprises can be understood as a 
countermeasure against the possible diminishment of its organizational base.   
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 15Table 1. Age and education of urban party members, 1988 and 2002 
                                                                      




Party members  Total population 
 









  18-24  1.0  1.2  15.7  10.3 
  25-34  12.6  8.9  21.9  15.6 
    35-44  31.2 24.4 25.4 25.1 
    45-54  34.7 35.2 19.9 28.2 
  55-64  17.9  18.6  11.0  12.1 











Number of observations    (4,755)  (4,356)  (23,183)  (16,969) 
 
 
1.  B.  Education                                                         (%) 
 





1988 2002 1988  2002  1988  2002 
College or above  24.5  42.9  8.1  20.3  11.8  26.1 
Senior high school  33.8  33.8  32.5  38.6  32.8  37.4 
Junior high school    29.6  18.7  38.1  29.6  36.2  26.8 
Primary school or 
below 















Number of observations  (4,735) (4,348) (16,297) (12,531) (21,032)  (16,879)
 
Note: Senior high school includes graduation from gaozhong and zhongzhuan 
(technical/vocational school) equivalent to gaozhong. Junior high school means graduation 
from chuzhong or equivalent educational level. Primary school or below includes graduation 
from primary school and semi-illiteracy. 
Sources: The 2002 and 1995 CASS CHIP surveys. 
 16Table 2. Distribution of age at joining the party 
          (%) 
      Y e a r   o f  
      j o i n i n g  
      t h e   p a r t y  
 














18-19  18.3  10.7  3.2   1.4   1.8   5.8  
20-24  55.9  51.7  20.5   11.4   8.2   26.6  
25-29  20.2  19.8  21.2   18.6   16.2   19.2  
30-34  4.6  9.4  18.9   20.3   23.1   16.5  
35-39  1.3  5.0  15.7   22.4   20.3   14.1  
40-44  0.0  2.8  10.0   16.5   15.3   9.8  
45-49  0.0  0.6  6.3   6.9   10.6   5.4  

















(480) (890)  (1,175)  (854) (878)  (4,277) 
Sources: The 2002 CASS CHIP survey. 
 17Table 3. Probit estimation of the determinants of party membership in selected historical 
periods in urban China 
 
Sources: The 1995 and 2002 CASS CHIP surveys.   




















Male 0.496  0.061  0.289  0.027  0.069  0.010 
 (9.31)***    (5.97)***    (1.11)   
College or above  0.454  0.056  0.854  0.080  1.018  0.147 
 (7.30)***    (11.69)***    (9.70)***   
Senior high school  0.133  0.017  0.427  0.040  0.462  0.067 
 (2.29)**    (5.78)***    (4.17)***   
Father's party 
membership 
0.006 0.001  0.051  0.005  0.094  0.014 
 (0.09)    (1.04)    (1.50)   
Constant -1.908    -2.279    -2.055   
 (37.35)***    (32.46)***    (20.46)***   
Number of 
 observations 
6, 237    8, 083    3, 455   
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the party membership (1 = party 
member) of age cohort 18-34 years in each historical period. Omitted independent variable is 
junior high school or below. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. ** denotes 





Table 4. Occupational structure of urban party members, 1988-2002 
 
4.A. Changes in occupational structure, 1988 and 2002        (%) 
 
 
4.B. Affiliation of higher status occupations by party membership, 2002    (%) 
Sources: The 1988 and 2002 CASS CHIP surveys. 
 
 
Party members  Non-party 
members 
 
Cadres and professionals/engineers in 
governmental and other public institutions 
58.4 50.8 
Executives of public owned enterprises    16.1 5.5 
Executives of non-public owned enterprises  4.9 2.5 
Professionals/engineers of public owned 
enterprises 
14.2 25.8 
Professionals/engineers of non-public owned 
enterprises 
5.8 13.4 
Private entrepreneurs   
 
0.7 2.0 
Total  100.0 100.0 
Number of observations   
 
(1525) (1731) 




1988 2002  1988  2002 
Workers/clerical staffs  54.2  44.7  83.3  67.9 
Executives of enterprises  5.8  11.6  0.5  2.0 
Cadres of governmental and other 
non-business institutions 
16.5 16.5  1.0  1.5 
Professionals/engineers 22.6  24.2  13.7  20.0 
Private entrepreneurs/owners of family 
business 
0.9 1.4  1.5  6.1 
Others 
 
0.0 1.7  0.0  2.6 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Number of observations   
 
 
(4,271) (2,911) (13,810)  (7,238) 
Note: Non-SOEs include former SOEs reorganized into state-share holding enterprises. 
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Table 5. Analytical framework of the determinants of membership structure, 1995 and 2002   
      Variables Description
Dependent variables at the city/county level (the party's membership structure by city) 
Juvenescence of the age structure 
(Share of younger members) 
 
Logit-transformed proportion of party members at ages 18-34 to the total 
number of party members in the city 
Improvement of educational level  
(Share of well-educated members) 
Logit-transformed proportion of well-educated   members to the total number 
of party members (college or above for urban area; senior high school or 
above for rural area) 
 
The degree of professionalization  
(Share of qualified professionals/engineers) 
Logit-transformed proportion of party members who hold the titles of higher 
or intermediate levels of professionals/engineers to the total number of party 
members.  
 
Explanatory variables indicating the socioeconomic characteristics of the city 
Overall level of regional economic development 
(Average income of the city/county) 
 
Per capita annual net income of sample households aggregated at the city level
Level of economic diversification of the region 
(Share of non-public owned sector employment) 
 
Proportion of non-public owned sector employment to total working 
population 
Educational level of the region   
(Average educational level of the region) 
Proportion of the population of age over 18 having senior high school or 
above education to the total population over age 18. 
 
Historical basis of the party 
(Transmission of party membership over generation)
Proportion of party members whose fathers also have party membership to the 
total number of party members 
 Source:  The  authors. 
  Note: See appendix II for descriptive statistics of each variable. 
 
 Table 6. Determinants of membership structure of the party in urban area: city-based OLS 





                        ( a )  







The degree of 
professionalization 
Average income  -0.364  0.350  0.188 
 (-2.95)***  (2.86)***  (1.46) 
Share of non-public owned 
sector employment 
0.133 -0.267 -0.132 
 (1.08)  (-2.18)**  (-1.03) 
Historical basis of the party  --  --  -- 
     
Constant -1.500  -0.932  -2.173 
 (-4.97)***  (-4.98)***  (-7.36)*** 
Number of observations  69  69  69 
Adjusted R-squared  0.090  0.102  0.01 
 
6.B. 2002 (not including historical basis of the party) 
 
 
                        
(a) 







The degree of 
professionalization 
Average income  -0.262  0.096  -0.011 
 (-2.32)**  (0.88)  (-0.10) 
Share of non-public owned 
sector employment 
-0.011 -0.362 -0.274 
 (-0.10)  (-3.32)***  (-2.44)** 
Historical basis of the party  --  --  -- 
     
Constant  -1.720 0.031 -1.593 
  (-4.60)*** (0.14) (-5.15)*** 
Number of observations  77  77  77 
Adjusted R-squared  0.04  0.109  0.050 
 216.C. 2002 ( including historical basis of the party) 
Source: The 2002 and 1995 CASS CHIP surveys.   
                        ( a )  







The degree of 
professionalization 
Average income  -0. 292  0.054  -0.043 
 (-2.63)***  (0.52)  (-0.39) 
Share of non-public owned 
sector employment 
0.032 -0.303 -0.229 
 (0.28)  (-2.90)***  (-2.06)  ** 
Historical basis of the party  0. 244  0.332  0.258 
 (2.18)**  (3.18)***  (2.33)** 
Constant -2.388  -0.530  -2.179 
 (-5.01)***  (-1.93)*  (-5.56)*** 
Number of observations  77  77  77 
Adjusted R-squared  0.090  0.206  0.104 
Notes: Coefficients are standardized regression coefficients. Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses. *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at 
the 10% level. 2. All dependent variables are logit-transformed.   
 
 
















Number of observations  1988 survey 1995  survey 2002  survey 
Cities 71  69  77 
Households  9,008 6,931 6,835 
Individuals  31,775 21,696 20,632 
Number of provinces  10 11 12 





















Sources: The 1988, 1995, and 2002 CASS CHIP surveys.   
 
 23Appendix II. Descriptive statistics of variables used for the city-based estimations of the 










Juvenescence of the age structure   
( %) 
69  0.12 0.08 0.01 0.47 
Improvement of educational level 
(%) 
69  0.35 0.10 0.08 0.56 
The degree of Professionalization 
(%) 
69  0.16 0.07 0.01 0.32 
Average income (1000 Yuan)  69  4.56 1.60 1.90 11.24 
Share of non-public owned sector 
(%) 
69  0.20 0.09 0.05 0.63 
2002 
  Number 
of obs. 
(cities) 





Juvenescence of the age structure  ( %) 77  0.11  0.07  0.01  0.30 
Improvement  
of educational level    (%) 
77 0.41  0.11  0.13  0.69 
The degree of 
 Professionalization  (%) 
77  0.12 0.06 0.01 0.27 
Average income (1000 Yuan)  77  7.73 2.73 3.51 15.41 
Share of non-public owned sector  (%) 77  0.40 0.12 0.10 0.72 
Historical basis of the party (%)  77  0.33 0.10 0.13 0.64 
Sources: The 1995 and 2002CASS CHIP surveys. 
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Appendix III. Comparison of CPC membership structure between urban and rural 
areas,1988-2002 
 










Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Gender         
  Male   75.1  91.2  65.0  85.5 
Age         
    18-19  0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 
    20-24  0.9 1.1 1.1 2.2 
    25-29  2.2 3.0 2.4 3.5 
  30-34  10.4  10.2  6.5  6.8 
  35-39  16.4  18.3  11.9  11.7 
    40-44  14.8 18.7 12.4 13.8 
    45-49  17.2 17.1 18.6 16.8 
    50-54  17.6 15.2 16.4 17.6 
  55-59  11.7  8.8  10.6  12.1 
    60-64  6.2 4.5 7.9 7.2 
  65-  2.7  2.6  11.7  8.2 
Educational attainment         
    College  or  above  24.5 0.8 42.9 3.6 
    Senior  high  school  33.8 18.0 33.8 29.6 
    Junior  high  school  29.6 36.2 18.7 44.7 
    Primary school or below  12.1  36.5  4.6  19.8 
    Illiterate  -- 8.5 -- 2.4 
Political credentials         
  Parents'  party  membership  --  --  33.9  19.3 
  Father’s  party  membership  --  --  31.9  18.3 











B. Age structure 


















































































Sources: The 1988 and 2002 CASS CHIP surveys.   
Note: Senior high school includes graduation from gaozhong and technical/vocational 
schools (zhongzhuan) equivalent to gaozhong. Junior high school means graduation from 
chuzhong or equivalent educational level. Primary school or below includes graduation from 
primary school and semi-illiteracy. Parents' party membership indicates membership of 
either father or mother. 
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Appendix IV    Constitutions of the Communist Party of China 
 
1.  Constitution amended at the 16th national congress of the party (November 14, 2002) 
General Program 
The Communist Party of China is the vanguard both of the Chinese working class and of the 
Chinese people and the Chinese nation. It is the leading core of the missions for the 
socialism with Chinese characteristics and represents the development of China's advanced 
productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests 
of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. The realization of communism is the 
highest ideal and ultimate goal of the Party.   
The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng 
Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of the "Three Represents" as its guide to action. 
 
Chapter I Membership 
Article 1: Any Chinese worker, peasant, member of the armed forces, intellectual, and any 
advanced element of other social strata who has reached the age of eighteen and who 
accepts the party's principles and constitution and is willing to join and work actively in one 
of the party organizations, carry out the party's decisions and pay membership dues regularly 
may apply for membership in the Communist Party of China.   
Article 2: Members of the Communist Party of China are vanguard fighters of the Chinese 
working class imbued with communist consciousness.   
 
2.  Constitution amended at the 15th national congress of the party (September 18, 1997) 
Chapter I Membership 
Article 1: Any Chinese worker, peasant, member of the armed forces, intellectual, and other 
revolutionary elements who has reached the age of eighteen and who accepts the party's 
principle and constitution and is willing to join and work actively in one of the party 
organizations, carry out the party's decisions and pay membership dues regularly may apply 
for membership in the Communist Party of China.   
 
3.  Constitution amended at the 12th national congress of the party    (September 6, 1982) 
General Program 
The Communist Party of China is the vanguard of the Chinese working class and a faithful 
representative of the interests of all nationalities in China. It is the leading core of the 
missions for Chinese socialism. The realization of communism is the highest ideal and 
ultimate goal of the Party.   
The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as 
its guide to action. 
 
Chapter I Membership 
Article 1: Any Chinese worker, peasant, member of the armed forces, intellectual, and other 
revolutionary elements who has reached the age of eighteen and who accepts the party's 
principle and constitution and is willing to join and work actively in one of the party 
organizations, carry out the party's decisions and pay membership dues regularly may apply 
for membership in the Communist Party of China. 
Article 2: Members of the Communist Party of China are vanguard fighters of the Chinese 
working class imbued with communist consciousness. 
 
4.  Constitution amended at the 11th national congress of the party (August 18, 1977) 
Chapter I Membership 
Article 1: Any Chinese worker, poor and lower-middle peasants, member of the  29
                                                 
revolutionary armed forces, or other revolutionary elements who has reached the age of 
eighteen and who accepts the Party's Constitution and is willing to join and work actively in 
one of the party organizations, carry out the party's decisions, observe the party's discipline 








1  The surveys on which this paper based on were funded by the Ford Foundation, Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency, Asian Development Bank, Masayoshi 
Ohira Memorial Foundation, the Grant in Aid for Scientific Research of the Japan Society 
of the Promotion of Science (JSPS), and Hitotsubashi University. The authors are grateful 
for their generous support. The authors also thank Toyo Bunko for their support during the 
preparation of this paper. 
2  Regarding to the basic structure of rural party members in comparison with urban 
members, see Appendix IIII and Sato and Eto (2006). 
3  Appendix I shows the distribution the sample households. See for detailed illustration of 
the CASS CHIP surveys, see Li, Luo, Wei, and Yue (forthcoming).   
4  See Appendix IV for changes in the membership principle of CPC. 
5  The correspondent part in the past constitutions was "revolutionary elements (gemin 
fenzi)." As literature on Chinese politics emphasizes, this is a critical turning point for the 
party because it implies a change to the party's identity as a working-class party. 
6  It should be noted that this paper, like most of the previous literature, does not cover rural 
area. We will analyze the membership structure of the rural party organization in our 
future research. 
7  The total number of party members in our samples is 4774 in 1988 and 4373 in 2002 (the 
proportion of party members to total number of individuals over 18 years old is 15.0 
percent in 1988 and 21.2 percent in 2002 respectively). in 2002. Number of effective 
observations in each table varies slightly because of missing values. Note that data on 
occupational structure have relatively large number of missing values (table 4). However 
we do not see any evidence that missing values on occupational statuses appear 
disproportionally between party members and non members.   
8  It is quite natural that there is a strong negative correlation between the degree of 
professionalization and the share of non-public owned sector because, as is shown in table 
3, party members with qualified professional skills mainly belong to public owned sector. 
This might draw criticism of tautology. However we expect that the number of qualified 
professional/engineers in non-public owned sector will increase rapidly and that the 
correlation will change in the near future. Thus, it will be meaningful to report the 
relationship between the degree of professionalization and ownership structure in 2002 as 
a benchmark for future research. 